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HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN t
I
THE NEW CRUSADE
Monopoly, like the poor, we seem to have always with us. It
seems but natural that a crusading administration so bent upon mini-
mizing the seeming scriptural fatalism anent the ever-presence of the
poor should, as part of that larger purpose, address itself to the serious
business of monopoly.
The crusaders against monopoly, like the crusaders of old, are
hampered by certain confusions and obscurities. The forces of the
crusaders are harassed by the differences between the economist Philips
and the lawyer Richards.' Then too there are those who see good
* The writer is indebted to Mr. William J. Shaughnessy, third year student in the
Georgetown Law School, for valuable assistance in the preparation of this article.
t A. B., 1927, University of Iowa; LL. B., 1933, Yale University; J. S.D., 1934,
Cornell University; author of Provisional Arrest and Detention in International Extra-
dition. (x934) 23 GEo. L. J. 37; Municipal Debt Readjustment: Present Relief and
Future Policy (1938) 23 CoRN. L. Q. 365; (with Albert B. Spector) Taxing and Spend-
ing: The Loaded Dice of a Federal Economy (1937) 23 CoRN. L. Q. I. Professor of
Law, Georgetown University.
I. As will appear from later discussion, when economists have talked about monop-
oly, they have been talking about something very different from what the lawyer has
traditionally understood by the term. An examination of the literature cannot fail to
reveal that the economist is capable of very nearly as much "wousening" (see FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (930) 6o et seq.) as the lawyer. Nevertheless it must
be said to the economists' credit that they seem finally to have reduced their definition
of monopoly to this essential---"control of the market"-i. e., control in the realistic
sense, without regard to particular methods employed in achieving such control.
Economists have a way of agreeing upon definitions and that is perhaps more than
lawyers do, but you cannot rely upon them when they attempt to go beyond the stage
of diagnosing ills. When economists attempt to cure, they seem, inirabile dictu, emo-
tional people-they are inclined to disagree, sometimes violently. The composite pre-
scription of almost any dozen economists for any given ill seems to read: "Do some-
thing, do anything, try this." To appreciate all this, one need only read the suggestions
made by various economists in HANDLER, THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A SYM-
POSIUM (932).
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and bad Saracens in the enemy camp, but do not see clearly which are
good and which are bad.
2
This new crusade against monopoly is distinctly an American
crusade and you cannot crusade in America without a committee. Even
now, on Capitol Hill, the Temporary National Economic Committee,
an inquisitorial body numbering among its members legislators and
administrators, lawyers and economists, is studying monopoly. 3 The
factual inquiry upon which they are now engaged, it is expected, will
lead to definite recommendations to the Congress. 4
What is it that has incited this present generation of "trust
busters" to the new crusade? The stark, cold, incontrovertible fact
is that, despite nearly a half century of antitrust legislation, we have wit-
nessed a steady concentration of wealth and economic control.5
2. See Kales, Good and Bad Trusts (1917) 30 HARV. L. REV. 830, 845.
3. The Committee, created pursuant to Pub. Res. 113, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938),
has as its Chairman Senator O'Mahoney (Wyoming) and as its Vice-Chairman, Rep-
resentative Sumners (Texas). Other members are Thurman W. Arnold, Assistant
Attorney General; Senator Borah (Idaho); William 0. Douglas, Chairman of the
Securities and Exchange Commission; Garland S. Ferguson, Chairman of the Federal
Trade Commission; Senator King (Utah) ; Representative Reece (Tennessee)-all
lawyers. Non-lawyer members include Isadore Lubin, Commissioner of Labor Statis-
tics, and Richard C. Patterson, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Leon Hender-
son is Executive Secretary to the Committee. Two vacancies exist, occasioned by the
appointment of Representative Eicher (Iowa) to the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, and by the death of Herman Oliphant, late General Counsel, United States Treas-
ury. See KAHo, THE MONOPOLY INVESTIGATION (1938).
4. Senator O'Mahoney's resolution creating TNEC provided that the Committee
should "make recommendation to Congress with respect to legislation upon . . . the
improvement of anti-trust policy and procedure and the establishment of national stand-
ards for corporations engaged in commerce among the States and with foreign nations".
Pub. Res. No. 113, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938).
5. According to Bureau of Internal Revenue statistics, 618 corporations held 53
per cent. of all corporate-owned assets in the United States in 1932. These 618 cor-
porations made up only two-tenths of one per cent. of the corporations reporting.
Eighty-five per cent. of all corporate-owned wealth, in the same year, was owned by
only five per cent. of the corporations. Fifty per cent. of the total net corporate income
went to 232 corporations. -One and two-tenths per cent. of our manufacturing corpora-
tions accounted for 63 per cent. of the total net profits. Two years later it was re-
ported that the only group of corporations which earned an aggregate net profit was
that group of corporations whose assets were in excess of $5ooooo. Concomitant
with this ever progressive rate of concentration was a strikingly high degree of con-
centration of the ownership of these corporations. In the halcyon year of 1929, stock
ownership had supposedly achieved a fairly wide spread; yet the income tax returns
for that year reveal that 3.28 per cent. of the persons who filed individual returns re-
ceived in excess of 83 per cent. of all dividends paid to individuals. Out of that 83
per cent., 78 per cent. were received by three-tenths of one per cent. of our people.
The Bureau's statistics for 1933 reveal only 1,747,74o taxable individual incomes in
the United States and about one-third of all property passing by death was found in
less than four per cent. of the estates. See Hearings before Senate Finance Committee
on H. R. 8974, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 176, 213. See further, BERLE AND MEANS,
THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) c. III, and FRANK, SAVE
AmERICA FIRST (1938) 235-250.
Statistics, such as the above, though revealing, sin on the conservative side. One
just cannot discern the limits of this tendency toward the centralization of economic
control-the holding company device and interlocking directorates have taken care of
that.
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The present Administration has been much disturbed by what has
been called "the unsolved problem of monopoly". 6 There has been
frequent protestation of the ineffectiveness of legislation touching the
control of big business 7-perhaps in no sector has the law in action
looked so different from the law in books." For years, economists and
some lawyers have urged the amendment of the antitrust laws and the
suggestions have run the gamut from the conservative lawyer who
would slip in a word here and a word there to the impatient economist
who would junk existing legislation and start from scratch in an en-
tirely different direction.9
6. The phrase is the Attorney General's (at the time of writing, Mr. Cummings
had not resigned his office). See Cummings, The Unsolved Problem of Monopoly
(1938) 72 U. S. L. REV. 23. Other evidence of the Administration's concern with the
unsolved problem may be found in ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (937) 207-
29; CUMMINGS AND MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JusTicn (1937) 317-351; FRANK, SAVE
AmmcA FIRST (1938) 235 et seq.; Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present Anti-
trust Procedure (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 1294; Arnold, Prosecution Policy Under the
Sherman Act (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 417; Dickinson, The Antitrust Laws and the Self
Regulation of Industry (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 60o; Jackson, Should the Antitrust Laws
be Revised? (i937) 71 U. S. L. REv. 575 (the same address under the title: Enforce-
tnent of Anti-Trust Laws is reprinted in (1937) 3 Fo. B. A. J. 7) ; Jackson and Dum-
bauld, Monopolies and the Courts (938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 231; Richberg, The
Monvpoly Issue (939) 87 U. or PA. L. REV. 375.
7. See supra note 6. These discussions all strike one as so many responses to Pres-
ident Roosevelt's call in his second inaugural address: "We must find practical controls
over blind economic forces and blindly selfish men." (Italics supplied.)
8. Attorney General Cummings pointed to the difference: "Moreover, the com-
plexities of modern existence and the pressure of events have undoubtedly had their
effect upon the anti-trust laws, their interpretation, and their administration. If you
look at the statutes do you find the law? Not at all. Only the simple expect to find
the law in the statute books. The law must be searched out, as if it were a quarry in
the tangled underbrush of an almost impenetrable forest." Cummings, The Unsolved
Problem of Monopoly (938) 72 U. S. L. REv. 23, 24. The Attorney General might
have been more general in framing his observation. He might have said, "Only the
simple expect to find the law in the books." Perhaps it was Dean Pound who first
called our attention in an arresting way to the difference between book law and active
law in his memorable Law in Books and Law in Action (igio) 44 Ams. L. REv. 12.
9. These proposals cannot be detailed here. Typical of the wide divergence of sug-
gestions during recent years have been the proposals of Senator Nye, Professor H.
Parker Willis and Mr. David Podell, which, along with others, are detailed in HAND-
LER, THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAws, A SYMPOSm (1932) 23-73.
Within the last half-dozen years the present Administration has done some mysti-
fying things to the antitrust laws. They were early kicked into a dark closet and
locked up only to be brought forth as one of the heroines of our "folklore", dressed in
ermine and the finest silk and told to "get goin' and do their stuff". So it was that in
1933, Section 3 (a) of the N. I.R.A., 48 STAT. 196 (i933), i5 U. S. C. A. § 703 (a)
(Supp. 1938) recited that the President might approve a voluntary code of fair com-
petition if he should find ". . . (2) that such code or codes are not designed to pro-
mote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and will not operate to
discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy of this title [Title I].
Provided, That such code or codes shall not permit monopolies or monopolistic prac-
tices". Section 5 of the N. I. R. A., 48 STAT. 198 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. § 705 (Supp.
x938), declared that, while Title I of this act is in effect and for sixty days thereafter,
any action complying with the provisions of an approved or prescribed code "shall be
exempt from the provisions of the antitrust laws of the United States". Senator Wag-
ner emphatically denied that § 2 of the Sherman Act was suspended, 77 Cong. Rec.
5163 (1933). Compare the statement of Professor McLaughlin, writing before the
National Industrial Recovery Act had been enacted into law: "It is replete with contra-
dictions and inconsistencies, some more patent than others. Perhaps the most patent
is the provision that codes shall not permit monopolies, while it is clearly contemplated
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The crusading forces are moving against monopoly along two
distinct fronts. The Congress, through its Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee, is both spying and reconnoitering. It seeks to ascer-
tain the economic strength of the enemy and to determine the strategic
positions the enemy forces occupy. Upon what it finds will depend
the nature of its recommendations to the Congress. But the high
command is waging war in still a different direction. It is testing its
available weapons, and what the high command may decide to do in
the future may well depend upon whether existing weapons now being
wielded by the inspired "trust busters" will prove adequate. In the
campaign now raging, the Department of Justice has singled out as
one of its major targets the Aluminum Company of America. The
theatre of war is the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. In the succeeding pages, the hopes and pros-
pects of both parties in the case of The United States of America v.
The Aluminum Company of America et al. will be appraised. It is
that the codes will involve market control which can only be effective on a monopolistic
basis. The part of the preamble about the fullest utilization of present productive
capacity was inserted after the bill was introduced. It appears to be an afterthought in
the nature of window dressing, and not in keeping with the spirit of the rest of the bill.
The implication that 'undue restriction of production' 'may be temporarily required'
may be attributed more to mere awkwardness than to Machiavellian design." Mc-
LAUGHLIN, CASES ON THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAws OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed.
1933) 719. The depression period attitude toward the antitrust laws is illustrated by
Cabot, The Vices of Free Competition (1g31) 21 YALE REV. 38; John Dickinson (for-
mer Assistant Attorney General, and former Assistant Secretary of Commerce) The
Antitrust Laws and the Self-Regulation of Industry (1932) 18 A. B. A. J. 6oo; Jaffee
and Tobriner, The Legality of Price Fixing Agreements (1932) 45 Haav. L. Rr.
1164. In the recent past business men have been bombarding the monopoly laws.
Among many printed attacks, one might single out Strawn, Should the Antitrust Laws
be Modified? (ig31) 54 N. Y. S. B. A. REP. 381; Williams, The Reign of Error (1932)
147 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 788.
'But all this is history and the antitrust laws are again in the center of the stage
supported by an all star chorus of "lusty trust busters". Here are a few notes sung by
the more prominent members of the chorus.
The Attorney General: "My proposition is that the Anti-Trust Division of the
Department of Justice should be more adequately implemented. Laws do not operate
in vacuo. They do not achieve their results automatically. There must be behind them
the driving force of the Government." Cummings, The Unsolved Problem of Monopoly
(1938) 72 U. S. L. REv. 23, 25, 26.
The Solicitor General: "Hence American business must make up its mind whether
it favors truly effective regulation by competition, as contemplated by the antitrust laws
or the inescapable alternative-government control. Every step to weaken those laws,
or to permit price fixing or monopolistic practices, is thus a step toward direct public
control of economic operations hitherto performed by private enterprise." (Italics sup-
plied.) Jackson and Dumbauld, Monopolies and the Courts (1938) 86 U. or PA. L.
REv. 231, 238.
The Assistant Attorney General, in charge of enforcement of the antitrust laws:
monopoly means, sooner or later, government interference in business. I am
willing to face the problem when the need arises. Yet it is precisely because I do not
wish those areas of necessary interference to increase and because I want to keep the
government out of business that I am an advocate of the consistent enforcement of the
Antitrust Laws. . . . The Antitrust Act represents a public policy to keep open and
free the channels of opportunity, which has never been more important than today."
Arnold, Fair and Effective Use of Present Antitrust Procedure (1938) 47 YALE L. J.
1294, 1295, 1303.
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a case that may well prove to be significant in the long list of prose-
cutions under the elusive Sherman Act.10 But one thing must be
obvious; just as public opinion is manufactured by high-geared propa-
ganda mills and disseminated among the public in time of war, so too,
in this important economic-legal struggle between the Government and
Alcoa, the parties are studiously devoting themselves to the dissemina-
tion of "truth" with the hope of garnering the good will of the reading
and the listening public. And so it is that the Attorney General, the
Solicitor General and the chief "trust buster" never lose an oppor-
tunity to present the larger issues by the spoken and the written word,1
often concluding with "the goblins'll get you ef you don't watch out".'
2
And so it is, too, that when you open your Sunday rotogravure sec-
tion, you may see the beautiful full page display of Alcoa's proud
crest-the advertisement itself shimmering with the beauty of "silver
from clay" 13-telling you that Alcoa's eight thousand stockholders
are "the most enthusiastic advocates of cheap aluminum". From the
mouths of those eight thousands, so the advertisement tells us, has come
this profession of faith: "The mere fact that no one else in this coun-
try has chosen to go into the business of producing raw aluminum
can never make our company successful. Our success depends on cus-
tomers, and an ever widening circle of customers." And then follows
Alcoa's proud boast! "Nature made Aluminum light but man has made
it cheap and plentiful and strong." 1
10. 26 STAT. 209 (i8go), 15 1. S. C. A. § Iet seq. (927).
ii. See supra note 6.
12. The goblins seem to be threats of the possibility, if not probability, of the Gov-
ernment's intrusion into "private!' business in one way or another.
The President: "We must find practical controls over blind economic forces and
blindly selfish men"--from his second inaugural address, significantly used as the closing
note by Solicitor General Jackson in a number of his public addresses. See, for exam-
ple, Jackson, Should the Antitrust Laws be Revised? (i937) 71 U. S. L. REV. 575, 582.
The Attorney General: "In this welter of things, nothing is more obvious than
the fact that big business, if I may use that term, is moving blindly but with accumulat-
ing acceleration down the road leading to ultimate Governmental supervision." Cum-
mings, The Unsolved Problem of Monopoly (938) 72 U. S. L. REv. 23, 27.
The Solicitor General: "American business must make up its mind whether it
favors the regulation by competition contemplated by our antitrust laws or the only
probable alternative-government control." Jackson, Should the Antitrust Laws be
Revised? (1937) 71 U. S. L. REv. 575, 577.
The Assistant Attorney General: "Intelligent men of all political parties agree that
unless competition can be maintained government regulation and interference with busi-
ness is inevitable." Arnold, Prosecution Policy Under the Sherman Act (1938) 24 A.
B. A. J. 417.
S. E. C. Commissioner Frank: See statement, quoted note 153, infra.
13. The name applied to the new metal when first it was called to the attention of
Napoleon III in 1854. See WALLAcE, MARKr CONTROL IN TE ALUmINUm INDUSTRY
(937) 3.
14. See N. Y. Times, Dec. 11, 1938, § 9, p. 4. It is interesting to compare with this
advertisement, so carefully calculated to excite the good will of the public toward the
industry, with the type of advertising indulged in by the Aluminum Company some
years ago, the purpose of which was, apparently at least, simply to sell its product. Cf.
Advertisement (1934) io FORTUNE, No. 3, P. 39.
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And now follows something by way of history-first, in brief
compass, the adventures of the Sherman Act in the federal courts dur-
ing nearly half a century; then, the story of the rise and progress of
Alcoa. It is only upon this two-fold background that the significant
issues of the present litigation take on perspective.
II
THE SHERMAN ACT-FORTY YEARS OF JUDICIAL PARRY AND THRUST
The industrialization of the United States, a comparatively unde-
veloped country, aided immeasurably by the advent of the steamship
and railroad and the consequent breaking down of natural trade bar-
riers, gave rise to a concerted scramble for wealth and power. Begin-
ning before the Civil War and gaining momentum thereafter, especially
during the Reconstruction Period, a movement toward concentratiori
of wealth and toward monopoly 16 had reached a point where a con-
siderable number of "trusts" 16 had arisen, concentrating in the hands
of comparatively few the control of the nation's wealth.17 The resul-
tant increase in prices and the stifling of that competition which was
too weak to crush the more powerful aroused widespread public outcry
which culminated in the passage of the Sherman Act.
The history of this particular legislation need not be given here,
as it is treated fully elsewhere.18 Suffice it to say that the problem of
monopoly and restraint of trade could not be adequately treated by
the several states 19 and that, while the common law forbade various
types of monopolies and practices in restraint of trade,20 the fact that
there existed no common law of the United States 21 necessitated proper
legislation by the Congress, if there were to be any effective protection
afforded against these "trusts".
15. The term "monopoly" is here used in its popular sense, not in the technical
sense of exclusive grant by the state.
16. This is another popular misnomer. The term is applied to large combinations
in trade and industry.
17. In this connection see HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION
(1937) 208; JONES, THE TRUST PROBLEM IN THE UNITED STATES (1928) 318, quoting
Harlan, J., in his dissent in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S.
1, 83 (1911). See generally, JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934).
18. JONES, Op. cit. supra note 17, at 318-320; KNAUTH, THE POLICY OF THE UNITED
STATES TOWARDS INDUSTRIAL MONOPOLY (1914) ; WALHER, HISTORY OF THE SHERMAN
LAW (I9IO).
i9. For an excellent discussion as to why state legislation was inadequate see
OWENS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND COMBINATION (Rev. ed. 1938) 547-550.
20. See Adler, Monopolizing at Common Law and Under Section Two of the
Sherman Act (1917) 31 HARv. L. REV. 246.
21. See Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. I, 50 (1911);
21 CONG. REC. 3253-3261 (189o) (debate on Sherman Act). The decision of the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938),
which overruled Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. I (U. S. 1842), is of interest in this connec-
tion. The Court held that there is no federal common law of the United States but
only the common law of the several states.
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The first two Sections of the Sherman Act 2 2 are of the most
importance since it is in these that the offences are designated, and it
is in the construction of these two sections that the effectiveness or
lack of effectiveness of the Act lies. As may be seen, the prohibitions
of the Act are couched in language so general in its terms as to be
susceptible to a variety of interpretations.
And it was precisely this generality of expression, intended by the
framers of the Act to provide ample room for judicial interpretation,
23
that gave the courts considerable difficulty and resulted in the oft-
repeated accusation of "judicial legislation".
24
To assist in the approach to the difficult problems afforded by the
present case, it might be well to examine the more important cases
which were brought against various corporations and associations by
the Government under Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act. The
treatment will necessarily be brief and is included only to supply a
springboard into a welter of difficulties, as yet unsolved, which may
well face the court in its determination of the case against the Alumi-
num Company.
The first case to come before the Supreme Court is now of histor-
ical interest only. This is the Knight case 2 5 in which the court held
that a combination producing some 98 per cent. of the refined sugar
of the United States was not violative of the Sherman Act, since "the
contracts and acts of the defendants related exclusively to the acquisi-
tion of the Philadelphia refineries and the business of sugar refining in
Pennsylvania, and bore no direct relation to commerce between the
States or with foreign nations".2 6 This case has been actually although
22. The provisions of §§ i and 2 of the Sherman Act are as follows:
"§ i. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
hereby declared to be illegal. . . ." 26 STAT. 209 (i8go), 15 U. S. C. A. § 1 (1927).
"§ 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a
misdemeanor. . . ." 26 STAT. 209 (189o), 15 U. S. C. A. § 2 (1927).
23. See 21 CONG. REc. 2524 et seq. (i8go). Senator Sherman in his speech before
the Senate said: "It is difficult to define in legal language the precise line between law-
ful and unlawful combinations. This must be left for the courts to determine in each
particular case. All that we, as lawmakers, can do is to declare general principles,
and . . . the courts will apply them so as to carry out the meaning of the law." Id.
at 2529.
24. 2 HoAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS (1903) 364. "It was expected
that the Court, in administering that law, would confine its operation to cases which
are contrary to the policy of the law, treating the words 'agreements in restraint of
trade' as having a technical meaning, such as they are supposed to have in England.
The Supreme Court of the United States went in this particular farther than was ex-
pected." Senator Hoar was the draftsman of the Antitrust Act.
25. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895).
26. Id. at 17.
516 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
not expressly overruled,27 but in fairness to the Court it should be
pointed out that the presentation of the Government's case was not all
that it might have been, and suffered on account of inadequate prep-
aration. 
2 8
The next two cases of importance to be decided by the Supreme
Court may be considered together, since the defendants in both were
associations of railroads formed for the purpose of stabilizing rates.
Both were held to be in violation of the Sherman Act. These Freight
Association cases 29 showed that railroads, although regulated by the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 were also within the prescriptions of
the Sherman Act. In both cases, the fact that railroads are common
carriers had considerable influence upon the decisions. Thus, it may
be noted, these associations were something more than mere associa-
tions of corporations formed to stabilize prices; they were in the nature
of public utilities and hence subject to the most stringent regulation
because of the direct effect on the public at large. Combinations of
public utilities operating under special franchise stand upon a different
footing than other combinations and may be said to be illegal per se.
The rationale of this doctrine evidently is that public utilities, operat-
ing under special franchise, necessarily exclude the general public from
competition and hence any combining on their part must be in re-
straint of trade and destructive of competition. 0
The vigorous dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice White in the
Trans-Missouri Freight Association case is of note since the doctrine
there propounded, later, in the Standard Oil case, became in effect the
view of the majority of the Court,31 although in the latter case the
same Mr. Justice White endeavored to reconcile the two. 2
The question of the constitutionality of the Sherman Act under
the commerce clause was determined in the Joint Traffic Association
case, the Court saying:
"Has not Congress with regard to interstate commerce and
in the course of regulating it, in the case of railroad corporations,
the power to say that no contract or combination shall be legal
which shall restrain trade and commerce by shutting out the oper-
ation of the general law of competition? We think it has." 
33
27. See HANDLER, THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A SYMPOsIUM (1932) i8I;
Morawetz, The Supreme Court and the Anti-Trust Act (igio) io COL. L. REv. 687, 688,
704 et seq.
28. TAT, THE ANTI-TRuST AcT AND THE SUPREME COURT (1914) 59.
29. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U. S. 290 (1897), and
United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505 (1898).
3o. To this effect see Kales, The Sherman Act (1918) 31 HARv. L. REV. 412, 419.
31. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. I (1911).
32. Id. at 64 et seq.
33. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U. S. 505, 569 (i898).
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The Live Stock Exchange cases,3 4 coming before the Supreme
Court in the same year as the Joint Traffic Association case, are rela-
tively unimportant for present purposes. The decision of the Court
was based on the same doctrine as that pronounced in the Knight case
-that the Sherman Act is violated only by those contracts or com-
binations that directly affect interstate commerce-although the parties
defendant in the Stock Exchange cases were not industrial combinations
but rather an association of commission merchants in one case, and
in the other an association of cattle merchants who sold and traded
for themselves.
The Addyston Pipe & Steel Company case 3 5 is the next case of
importance and for several reasons. It was the first case involving an
industrial combination since the ill-fated Knight case, but this time the
issue was squarely presented to the court. The defendants were a com-
bination of pipe manufacturers which by agreement had undertaken
to fix prices and divide markets, and in the localities to which no mem-
ber of the association had been exclusively assigned, a committee de-
termined the price and awarded the contract to the member who would
pay the largest bonus to the other members. The market controlled
by this combination extended over a large area. In a unanimous opin-
ion, the Court held that the agreement constituted a direct restraint
on interstate commerce and violated Section i of the Sherman Act.
The effect of this decision was to revitalize and to restore to a large
measure the effectiveness of the Act against combinations in restraint
of trade, which the Knight case had "emasculated".
Next to be considered is the famous case of the Northern Securi-
ties Company,3 6 one of the three most far-reaching cases to arise under
the first two Sections of the Act (the others being the Standard Oil
case 3 7 and the United States Steel case 38). The victory gained here
by the Government marked another forward step toward the crystal-
lization of consistent judicial application of the Sherman Act which
reached its culmination in the Standard Oil case. In this case the Court
begins to emerge from the darkness and doubt which had enveloped it
in the earlier days.
The Northern Securities Company was a holding company, the
first of this type to be brought before the Supreme Court as a cor-
porate instrument wielded in defiance of the Sherman Act. It was
organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey in 19O1 to con-
34. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578 (898), and Anderson v. United States,
171 U. S. 604 (1898).
35. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899).
36. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
37. Standard Oil Co. of N. J. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1 (1911).
38. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
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solidate control of the Northern Pacific Railway and Great Northern
Railway which had been parallel and competing lines between Minne-
sota and Oregon.39 It acquired in exchange for its own stock a ma-
jority of the shares of each of the two lines, thus subjecting them to
a unified control. The Government brought suit in equity for the
dissolution of this consolidation. The lower court's judgment for the
Government ordering dissolution was affirmed by the Supreme Court,
per Harlan, J.,40 who in addition to summarizing the precedents of anti-
trust litigation under the Sherman Act affirmed the power of the Act
to reach the holding company device by declaring that no device,
however skillfully such device may have been con-
trived, and no combination, by whomsoever formed, is beyond
the reach of the supreme law of the land, if such device or com-
bination by its operation directly restrains commerce among the
States or with foreign nations in violation of the act of Con-
gress." 4-
In the year following the decision in the Northern Securities Com-
pany case, the Supreme Court considered the case of Swift & Company
v. United States.42 The group against whom the prosecution was di-
rected was
a combination of a dominant proportion of the deal-
ers in fresh meat throughout the United States not to bid against
each other in the live stock markets of the different States, to bid
up prices for a few days in order to induce the cattle men to send
their stock to the stockyards, to fix prices at which they will sell,
and to that end to restrict shipments of meat when necessary, to
establish a uniform rule of credit to dealers and to keep a black
list, to make uniform and improper charges for cartage, and
finally, to get less than lawful rates from the railroads to the
exclusion of competitors." 43
The decision to be reached was obvious if it could be shown that the
combination was directly in restraint of interstate trade. The court
39. The background of the consolidation negotiations and achievement is an inter-
esting story of the battle of the Titans-Morgan, Hill and Harriman. For an account
of these transactions see JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934) 231-252, 432-450.
40. The decree enjoined the Northern Securities Company from voting the stock
of the Northern Pacific Railway and the Great Northern Railway. The latter two were
enjoined from paying any stock dividends to the Northern Securities Company. The
Northern Securities Company was given the choice of returning the stock held by it to
each of the railway companies or of transferring such stock to holders of its own shares
originally issued in exchange for the stock of these companies. As a commentary on
the effectiveness of such decree the reported words of Mr. James J. Hill, one of the
defendants and the well-known "Empire Builder", are of interest: "two certificates of
stock are now issued instead of one; they are printed in different colors, and that is the
main difference." Quoted in JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER BARONS (1934) 450, and alluded
to in CUMINGS AND McFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE (1937) 331.
41. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 347 (9oa).
42. I96 U. S. 375 (9o5).
43. Id. at 394.
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had no difficulty in finding such restraint, easily distinguishing it on
this basis from the Knight case.
4 4
In 1911 there were decided two cases 45 in which the doubt that
had been plaguing the Court ever since the passage of the Sherman
Act was finally resolved. The interpretation of Sections i and 2 of
the Act had been impeded up to now by the dilemma confronting the
Court concerning the meaning to be given to the words "in restraint
of trade". 46  How inclusive was the phrase? Did it extend to any
or all restraints, whether reasonable or unreasonable? Or must the
restraint be shown to be unreasonable or of a certain kind and degree?
If extended to any or all restraints, whether reasonable or not, then
conceivably a very small partnership, typical of those which may be
found in practically every city and town in the country, would be sub-
ject to dissolution if engaged in interstate commerce. Could such
have been the legislative intent? The answer was given in the opinion
of Mr. Justice White in the most important case arising under the
Sherman Act, the historic Standard Oil Company case.
47
The history of the activities of the Standard Oil Company from
its inception up to the time of the filing of this suit is notorious and
has been the subject of many exhaustive treatments.48  Only a brief
summary is needed here. Suffice it to say, as far as the main facts
are concerned, that there was here involved a concentration in the hands
of a holding company of the stock of various corporations dealing in
petroleum and petroleum products and occupying a preponderant posi-
tion in the industry.4 9  In view of the nature and number of predatory
practices of which the Standard Oil Company was guilty 1o in its rise
to a dominating position, it was obvious which way the decision would
turn under any view of the law. The case is important, not for its
44. United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (I895).
45. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. I (1911), and
United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. io6 (1911).
46. See Kales, supra note 3o, at 413.
47. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. i (1911).
48. See DODD, COMBINATIONS, THEIR USES AND ABUSES, WITH A HISTORY OF THE
STANDARD OIL TRUST (1888); TARBEL, HISTORY OF THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY
(reissue 1925).
49. According to JONES, op. cit. supra note 17, at 58, in 19o4, only 9 per cent. of the
total production of refined oil in the United States was produced by independent refiners.
5o. The predatory practices, as listed in the Court's opinion, were "Rebates, prefer-
ences and other discriminatory practices in favor of the combination by railroad com-
panies; restraint and monopolization by control of pipe lines, and unfair practices
against competing pipe lines; contracts with competitors in restraint of trade; unfair
methods of competition, such as local price cutting at the points where necessary to
suppress competition; espionage of the business of competitors, the operation of bogus
independent companies, and payment of rebates on oil, with the like intent; the division
of the United States into districts and the limiting of the operations of the various sub-
sidiary corporations as to such districts so that competition in the sale of petroleum
products between such corporations had been entirely eliminated and destroyed. . .
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. i, 42 (1911).
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decision, but for the reasons for its decision as set forth by Mr. Chief
Justice White. It was here that the now famous "rule of reason" was
enunciated in the most definite statement of doctrine made by the Court
to date. It was in this case that the darkness was dispelled. Speaking
of the interpretation to be given to the Sherman Act the Court, after
a searching exposition of the common law doctrines dealing with
"monopoly" and "restraint of trade" and a consideration of the gen-
erality of expression in the wording of the first two Sections of the
Act, said:
.. . it inevitably follows that the provision necessarily
called for the exercise of judgment which required that some
standard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining
whether the prohibitions contained in the statute had or had not
in any given case been violated. Thus not specifying but indubit-
ably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows that it was
intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at
the common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of
the character embraced by the statute, was intended to be the meas-
ure used for the purpose of determining whether in a given case
a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against
which the statute provided." 51 (Italics supplied.)
The meaning given, then, to the Sherman Act is that it prohibits
not any and all, but rather unreasonable or undue restraint of trade or
attempts to monopolize. The import of the decision was more fully
defined in the American Tobacco Company case.52  The Court held
that there had been a violation of the Sherman Act by a combination
which, although employing a very complicated method of stock own-
ership, had engaged in predatory practices to stifle competition and
achieve to all intents and purposes a monopoly. In making the deci-
sion the Court elaborated further upon the "rule of reason" and de-
clared that the record before the Court
"... if possible serves to strengthen our conviction as to the
correctness of the rule of construction, the rule of reason, which
was applied in the Standard Oil Case, the application of which
rule to the statute we now, in the most unequivocal terms, reexpress
and reaffirm." 53
The St. Louis Terminal case 54 decided in 1912, was concerned
with an unusual factual situation and for this reason stands in a dif-
ferent position from other "monopoly" or "restraint of trade" cases.
51. Id. at 6o.
52. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. io6 (1911).
53. Id. at i8o.
54. United States v. St. Louis Terminal Ass'n, 224 U. S. 383 (1912).
ALUMINUM AND MONOPOLY
The peculiar topographical situation of St. Louis made possible a com-
bination of all of the railroad terminal facilities of that city by an
association controlled by fewer than all of the companies who had to
use these facilities in order to have a means of entering and leaving
the city. This combination was held to be illegal even though the
companies who were not associated in the control of the facilities, were
not, as a matter of fact, prevented from utilizing them. The restraint
was actual although unexercised. The decree of the Court is inter-
esting. It recognized the efficiency and benefits to be gained by unifi-
cation and hence did not order a dissolution of the association as de-
sired by the government. Instead, the association was to be dissolved
only if it did not reorganize so that it would be controlled by all of
the companies needing to use the terminal facilities, without discrim-
ination against any.55 In connection with this case, it should be reit-
erated that the unusual topographical situation of St. Louis was a
decidedly important factor in the result for, as the Court said: "But
the situation at St. Louis is most extraordinary, and we base our con-
clusion in this case, in a large measure, upon that fact." 51 It is also
worthy of note that there is no evidence in the record of predatory
practices.
A combination of railroads again invited the attention of the
Supreme Court in the Union Pacific case 57 which was decided in 1912.
Again the combination, achieved this time by stock acquisition, and
not by the holding company device as in the Northern Securities Com-
pany case,5 was held to be illegal. The case is different also from
the Northern Securities Company case in that there were not involved
parallel and competing lines; neither did the lines operate between the
same cities nor over similar routes. At best, they were competitors
for some of the transcontinental traffic. Lacking also was the element
of price stabilization present in the Traffic Association cases. 59 The
mere combining of competing railroads is per se illegal, for as the
Court said:
"The consolidation of two great competing systems of rail-
road engaged in interstate commerce by a transfer to one of a
dominating stock interest in the other creates a combination which
restrains interstate commerce within the meaning of the statute,
because, in destroying or greatly abridging the free operation of
competition theretofore existing, it tends to higher rates." 60
55. See a discussion of this case in Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust
Laws (1932) 32 COL. L. Rav. 2O et seq.
56. United States v. St. Louis Terminal Ass'n, 224 U. S. 383, 405 (1912).
57. United States v. Union Pacific R. R., 226 U. S. 61 (1912).
58. 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
59. See supra note 29.
6o. United States v. Union Pacific R. R., 226 U. S. 6I, 88 (1912).
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Although nowhere does the Court indicate in this case that railroads
should stand on a footing different from other industries, yet it is sub-
mitted again (at the risk of being repetitious) that if the holdings in
railroad cases, seemingly inconsistent with the decisions in the other
cases, are to be reconciled with the latter it should be on the ground
that railroads are public utilities operating under franchises which effec-
tively prevent competition from being freely entered into against them
by the public, and, that this being so, any combination of competing
railroads is contrary to the public policy expressed by the grant of a
franchise and is per se in restraint of trade and hence illegal under
the Sherman Act.
In 1913 the question of the trade association was presented to
the Court in the Lumber Dealers' Association case. 61 The defendant
was an association of retail lumber dealers which circulated among its
membership a "blacklist" naming certain wholesalers who dealt directly
with the consumer, with the object in view that members of the asso-
ciation would not trade with such wholesalers. The circulation of these
lists was enjoined on the ground that the intended effect was an undue
restraint of interstate trade and commerce and violative of the Sher-
man Act. This case is of interest because of the nature of the com-
bination involved and because of the type of boycott enjoined.
The shoe machinery trust was attacked by the Government from
two sides, the criminal and the equity. In the criminal prosecution 62
under the Sherman Act, a demurrer to the indictment was sustained
and the ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court. The defendants
were a combination of several companies, each controlling basic patents
for machinery used in the various phases of shoe manufacture so that
the United Shoe Machinery Company of New Jersey, the resulting
combination, produced over 90 per cent. of the shoe machinery of the
country.6 3  Mr. Justice Holmes, who delivered the opinion of the
Court affirming the ruling of the lower Court characterized the com-
bination as follows:
61. Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U. S. 6oo
(1914).
62. United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202 (1913).
63. See the chart given in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clark, in the Su-
preme Court decision in the equity proceeding:
"Machines in Use in Manufactured by Manufactured by
This Country Defendants all others
Lasting machines 7,496 7
Standard screw machines 409 None
Pegging machines 146 None
Tacking machines 3,488 6
Welt sewing machines 2,527 142
Outsole stitching machines 2,676 758
Loose-nailing machines 1,835 24
Heeling machines 2,019 17"
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 89 (1918).
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"On the face of it the combination was simply an effort after
greater efficiency. The business of the several groups that com-
bined, as it existed before the combination is assumed to have
been legal. The machines are patented, making them is a mo-
nopoly in any case, the exclusion of competitors from the use of
them is of the very essence of the right conferred by the patents,
. it is hard to see why the collective business should be any
worse than its component parts. . . The disintegration aimed
at by the statute does not extend to reducing all manufacture to
isolated units of the lowest degree." 64
Similarly in the equity proceeding,65 the Court viewed the combina-
tion as legitimate, declaring, "certainly improvement of business and
its efficiency can be striven for without offense to the law", 6 and again:
"The company, indeed, has magnitude, but it is at once the
result and cause of efficiency and the charge that it has been op-
pressively used is not sustained. Patrons are given the benefits of
the improvements made by the company and new machines are
substituted for the old one without disproportionate charge." 67
In 1920, the extremely interesting case of the United States Steel
Corporation 6  was decided. The decision here is one of the most
severely criticized in the whole line of antitrust cases. The defendant
was a holding company controlling twelve important concerns engaged
in every phase of the iron and steel business which at the time of its
formation amounted to well over one-half 69 of the total iron and steel
business of the country although the percentage of control had dwindled
at the time suit was brought to approximately 5o per cent.70  At the
time of effecting the combination there was an intent to monopolize;
there were also numerous "gentlemen's agreements" in restraint of
trade,71 purchases of competitors' businesses, 72 very heavy overcapi-
talization and watering of stocks, enormous promoters' profits and large
64. United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202, 217 (1913).
65. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32 (1918).
66. Id. at 53.
67. Id. at 56.
68. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
69. See HANDLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION (1937) 422.
7o. For an interesting discussion of the economic effects of combinations of com-
petitors in a large company, controlling a great percentage of a particular business see
the discussions by Burns, Berle, and Laidler, in HANDLER, THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRuST
LAws, A Symposiu (1932) 143-172. The theories of Mr. Louis D. Brandeis are ex-
pressed in his testimony before the Committee on Interstate Commerce of the U. S.
Senate pursuant to SEN. RES. No. 98, Dec. 14-16, 1911, and before the Committee of
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives pursuant to H. R. 11380, January 26-27,
1912.
71. These agreement were reached at the noted "Gary dinners".
72. Chief among these was the acquisition of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company
in 1907. The approval of President Roosevelt had been obtained previous to the pur-
chase.
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dividends as the result of high prices. At first glance one would think
in view of previous decisions that here was an excellent opportunity
for the application of the sanctions of the Sherman Act-but not so
the Court, which found that any predatory practices which had been
indulged in were abandoned before suit was brought, as was the intent
to monopolize, and that since no monopoly in fact existed,7 3 the Steel
Company was not violating the Sherman Act. As to the immensity
of the corporation the Court declared that:
.. .the law does not make mere size an offense, or the
existence of unexerted power an offence. It, we repeat, requires
overt acts and trusts to its prohibition of them and its power to
repress or punish them. It does not compel competition nor
require all that is possible." 14
The case, therefore is an example of how flexible and susceptible of
wide application is the so-called standard or norm, applied to antitrust
cases since the Standard Oil case 7 -the "rule of reason".
The International Harvester case 7 is frequently mentioned in
connection with the United States Steel case. A consent decree had
been entered against the Harvester Company in 1918 after it had been
prosecuted under the Sherman Act.77  In 1927, the Supreme Court
was called upon to determine whether the 1918 consent decree had
been complied with. The company's percentage of control of the in-
dustry at this time was 64 per cent. In its opinion the Court reaffirmed
the dictum of the Steel case to the effect that mere size and unexercised
power of control in the absence of unlawful conduct will not violate the
antitrust laws.
78
Then, in 1927, there was decided the now famous case of the
Trenton Potteries Company,79 involving a trade association of manu-
facturers and distributors of 82 per cent. of the sanitary pottery (used
in bathrooms and lavatories) produced in the United States, organized
to fix and maintain uniform prices. The association was held to be
violative of the Sherman Act. The particular type of association con-
sidered here, a "loose" combination, apparently constitutes an excep-
tion to that class of combinations which is measured by the "rule of
reason" set out in the Standard Oil case. 0 The question of reason-
73. Some two hundred customers testified that there was a strong competition in
the steel business.
74. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417, 451 (,920).
75. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. i (i91i).
76. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693 (1927).
77. United States v. International Harvester Co., 214 Fed. 987 (D. Minn. 1914),
appeal dismissed on motion of appellants, 248 U. S. 587 (19r8).
78. United States v. International Harvester Co., 274 U. S. 693, 708 (1927).
79. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927).
8o. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. i (1911).
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ableness or unreasonableness of price-fixing combinations is immaterial
for, as the Court points out:
"Beginning with United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Association, supra; United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171
U. S. 505, where agreements for establishing reasonable and uni-
form freight rates by competing lines of railroad were held un-
lawful, it has since often been decided and always assumed that
uniform price-fixing by those controlling in any substantial man-
ner a trade or business in interstate commerce is prohibited by
the Sherman Law, despite the reasonableness of the particular
prices agreed upon." "1 (Italics supplied.)
The reason for so holding is given by the Court as follows:
"The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effec-
tive, is the elimination of one form of competition. The power to
fix prices, whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power
to control the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices.
The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and busi-
ness changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once
established, it may be maintained unchanged because of the absence
of competition secured by the agreement for a price reasonable
when fixed." 82
The final case to be considered was decided in 1936. This was
Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States.8 3 The defendant was a trade
association the members of which together refined nearly all imported
raw sugar and supplied between 70 and 8o per cent. of the sugar con-
sumed in the United States. They had entered into a "basic agree-
ment" which required them to adhere to certain prices publicly an-
nounced, which prohibited quantity discounts, which set arbitrary
uniform terms for cash discounts and which provided for various
other like restrictions. These restrictions amounted to price-fixing in
restraint of trade and were held to be illegal.
From the cases thus discussed an endeavor will be made to evaluate
the present position of the Sherman Act with respect to the suit now
in progress against the Aluminum Company. Before proceeding fur-
ther, however, it is submitted that the railroad cases 84 and cases in-
volving trade associations 85 should be looked upon as being of differ-
81. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 398 (1927).
82. Id. at 397.
83. 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
84. Principally, Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904);
United States v. Union Pacific R. R., 226 U. S. 61 (1912) ; and the Freight Association
cases, supra note 29.
85. Principally, Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234
U. S. 6oo (1914) ; United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392 (1927) ; Sugar
Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U. S. 553 (1936).
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ent types than the other cases which follow "the rule of reason". They
are reconcilable with the latter cases, but only if it is borne in mind
that they stand upon a different footing and should be rationalized
upon a different basis. Railroads, as has been mentioned before in
discussing the railroad cases, should be considered as public utilities.
It should likewise be noted that trade associations, when price-fixing
agreements are involved, constitute a special class to which the "rule
of reason" is not unqualifiedly applied. They are illegal per se and it
makes no difference whether the prices fixed are reasonable or not.
Whether one agrees with the Court's holding or not, it would appear
that such is its view of the application of the Sherman Act, and by
keeping these exceptions in mind it becomes possible to reconcile seem-
ingly contradictory and paradoxical statements by the Court in the
various cases which have arisen under the Act. Or, to put it differ-
ently, a combination of railroads or public utilities is of its very nature
"unreasonable"; likewise, a trade association having for its purpose
the fixing of prices is of its very nature "unreasonable" regardless of
whether the prices fixed are reasonable or not. Such seems to be the
effect of the cases.
Having thus distinguished the railroad and trade association
cases from the others, the following division of topics will form the
basis for a discussion which, it is hoped, will clarify the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Sherman Act. Consideration of the cases
will be grouped under five topics or headings: A. Type of Corporation
-a consideration of the legality of the various devices conceived of in
an effort toward unified control of combinations; B. Size-the effect of
the size of a corporation upon its legality; C. Purpose-the intent with
which the corporation was formed; D. Predatory Practices; E. Con-
trol of the market-the economic concept of monopoly.
A. Type of Combination
Combinations may be generally divided into "loose" and "inte-
grated" combinations. The former embrace such combinations as
trade associations, pools and exchanges. As has been repeatedly stated,
these are per se in violation of the Sherman Act when coupled with
price fixing agreements. "Integrated" combinations are distinguished
from the "loose" associations in which the component parts retain
their individuality by the unification of control or ownership or both
which is achieved by such methods and devices as trusts, holding com-
panies, stock acquisitions and property purchases. In the case of
these integrated combinations, there has as yet been no decision hold-
ing any particular one to be illegal per se. The holding company
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device has in some cases been held illegal, 6 but it is to be noted that
there are other cases involving the holding company device in which
the defendant was not guilty of a violation of the Sherman Act. 7 The
same is true of the other forms of combinations which have resulted
in "integrated" combinations. From a consideration of these cases it
will become apparent that the form which the combination takes is in
itself not a controlling factor in determining its legality. 8
B. Size
The degree of predominance achieved by a "trust" or combina-
tion is not, in and of itself sufficient to predicate the legality or illegal-
ity of a combination under the Sherman Act. "Mere size", the courts
have repeatedly held, "is no offence". A comparatively small (by
this is meant less than 50 per cent.) degree of control of the total
industry is not, on the other hand, a certain defence, since a partial
restraint may be illegal and a monopoly may be relative. However,
under certain circumstances, size may give rise to a prima facie pre-
sumption of illegality.8 9 This presumption may, however, be rebutted.
C. Purpose
The element of purpose or intent may be of the utmost importance
as becomes evident from a reading of the Act, especially when crim-
inal proceedings are brought thereunder. This element is essential
when "conspiracy" is charged. Likewise, under Section 2, which for-
bids "any attempt to monopolize", if no monopoly has resulted, the
intent is necessarily to be proved. 0 However, it is the consensus of
the authorities that if the effect of the contract, combination or con-
spiracy is to restrain trade unduly or to achieve a monopoly, the ques-
tion of intent then becomes immaterial. 9" It has also been held that
a monopolistic intent, since abandoned, is not punishable.92 It may
be concluded then, apart from "conspiracy in restraint of trade",
86. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197 (1904).
87. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
88. In the American Tobacco Company case, the court declared that the form of
combination is immaterial. United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U. S.
io6, i8o (ig1). However, there is an evident judicial prejudice in favor of the "in-
tegrated" as opposed to the "loose" combination. Hardy, Loose and Consolidated Com-
binations under the Antitrust Laws (1933) 21 GEo. L. J. 123.
89. Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. i (1911).
9o. See United States v. Quaker Oats Co., 232 Fed. 499 (D. Ill. i9x6), appeal dis-
Missed, 253 U. S. 499 (1920).
91. Mr. Justice Peckham in the Joint Traffic Association case, commenting upon
the decision in the Trans-MiTsouri case, 171 U. S. 505 (I898), said: "An unlawful in-
tent in entering into the agreement was held immaterial, but only for the reason that
the agreement did in fact and by its terms restrain trade." United States v. Joint Traf-
fic Association, 171 U. S. 505, 561 (x898).
92. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
528 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
"attempt to monopolize" and criminal prosecutions under the Act, that
the effect and not the intent is the controlling consideration.
D. Predatory Practices
Predatory practices may be defined as any unlawful means or
methods the effect of which is unduly to restrain trade, eliminate com-
petition, effectuate a monopoly, or preserve a monopoly once achieved.
To put it differently, they are exclusive tactics.98  Predatory practices
are always in violation of the Sherman Act and the courts will always
issue injunctions against them. However, if there has been an aban-
donment of these practices before the bringing of suit, no injunction
will issue. 94 In practically every case of violation of the Sherman Act,
the Court has found evidence of predatory practices and in the words
of one commentator, "The whole question, therefore, comes down to
the question of interference with outsiders, that is, to one of meth-
ods." 95 While this can hardly be unqualifiedly subscribed to-the
whole question certainly comes to more than just methods-never-
theless, the statement is true to the extent that the presence of preda-
tory practices gives rise to a stronger than prima facie presumption of
illegality and in numerous cases is the disturbing weight which throws
the balance of justice one way or the other.
E. Control of the Market
The law has frowned on monopoly from the earliest times. The
threefold reason why monopoly is contrary to the public interest is
given in the old case of Darcy v. Allein.9 6
"The price of the same commodity will be raised, for he who
has the sole selling of any commodity, may and will make the
price as he pleases. . . . The :d incident to a monopoly is, that
after the monopoly granted, the commodity is not so good and
merchantable as it was before; for the patentee having the sole
trade, regards only his private benefit, and not the common-
wealth. 3. It tends to the impoverishment of divers artificers
and others, who before, by the labour of their hands in their art
or trade had maintained themselves and their families, who now
will of necessity be constrained to live in idleness and beggary."
Of course the monopoly granted in the case was a monopoly strictly
so-called, that is, to quote Coke: "
93. The predatory practices indulged in by the Standard Oil Company have been
listed, supra note 5o. The list constitutes an excellent collection of virtually every type
of predatory practice.
94. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
95. Raymond, The Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases (1911) 25 HARv. L. REV. 3r,
56.
96. i Co. 84b, 86b, 77 Eng. Reprints i26o, 1263 (162).
97. 3 Co. Inst. 181.
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". .. an institution, or allowance by the king by his grant,
commission, or otherwise to any person or persons, bodies poli-
tique, or corporate, of or for the sole buying, selling, making,
working, or using of any thing, whereby any person or persons,
bodies politique, or corporate, are sought to be restrained of any
freedome, or liberty that they had before, or hindred in their law-
full trade."
Although the concept of monopoly has expanded considerably since
Lord Coke's time, to the point where the term is so inclusive as to
defeat any attempt at a precise nicety of definition, the statement of
the reasons behind the public policy discouraging monopoly are essen-
tially the same as those given in Darcy v. Allein. Naturally enough
the public at large is most materially injured when, as the result of
monopoly, consumers' prices are raised. It is an unquestioned attribute
of monopoly that it have the power to fix prices. In the trade asso-
ciation cases we observed that price-fixing agreements are contrary
to the policy expressed by the Sherman Act, and this is true whether the
prices fixed are reasonable or not. These agreements fixing prices
between competitors are contracts directly in restraint of trade, the
parties by their own acts endeavoring to divest themselves of the
means of competition, something which the law has always abhorred.
It is likewise undoubted that a corporation, predominating in some
particular industry, offends the policy of the law when it charges prices
that are unreasonable. But what of the corporation or combination
which completely, or almost completely, controls an industry? There
is no doubt that its position gives it the power effectively to control the
market. And yet, if in fact the combination does not exercise its power
to the extent of fixing or attempting to fix prices that are unreason-
able, can it be said that such unabused control of the market (for
actually the exclusive power to fix prices amounts to control) is non-
theless illegal? At the back of the problem, thus raised, there is a vast
amount of tumult and shouting, bickering and quibbling, recrimina-
tion and cross-recrimination, arising from the battleground where legal-
ists and economists are wrapt in conflict. And yet it is in reality a
sham battle. The meaning of the term "monopoly" is the point around
which the storm rages. To the economist, the term monopoly conveys
the notion of market control. To the lawyer, the term monopoly has
a different connotation. Monopoly has the element of illegality; with-
out this there is no monopoly. The economist is concerned with the
existence of power, the lawyer with its exercise. Yet the economists
themselves are, apart from law, divided as to the advisability of allow-
ing large combinations. Size to the point of control, when regulated,
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is looked upon by some as desirable, by others as most objectionable.98
The concern of the courts is with the statute and its interpretation.
The question is as to whether the statute is broad enough to permit an
interpretation of it in accordance with the economic concept of mo-
nopoly. It is difficult to visualize such an expansion without a legis-
lative flat. The hold of the common law and of precedent is appar-
ently too strong. The Trenton Potteries case, previously discussed,
is considered by some as authority for the proposition that a com-
bination which has a preponderating influence in a particular industry
and has consequently the power to fix prices, i. e. controls the market,
and agrees to fix prices, is per se in violation of the Sherman Act.
This proposition is correct as applied to price-fixing agreements be-
tween competitors combining in a "loose" association, and it is imma-
terial whether the prices fixed are reasonable or not. But this is by
no means the same as holding that every combination, "loose" or "inte-
grated", which occupies a predominant position in the industry and
consequently possesses power to control the market in that industry
is illegal per se, regardless of whether this power is exercised arbitrarily
and unreasonably.
III
ALCOA-THE GROWTH OF AN INDUSTRY
When, on April 23, 1937, the United States filed a petition in
equity in the District Court for the Southern District of New York,
against the Aluminum Company of America, its officers and subsid-
iaries, charging them with violations of the Sherman Antitrust Law
and praying for a dissolution of the company, a unique situation and
one fraught with legal difficulties was presented to the courts. To
illustrate the importance which is attached to this case by the gov-
ernment, a statement contained in an article 9' by the Honorable Robert
Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the United States, is note-
worthy:
"In April, commenting on the fact that the Aluminum Com-
pany suit not only puts the company on trial for monopoly, but
also puts the existing antitrust laws on trial, Mr. Walter Lipp-
man said: 'The restoration of competition is the only possible
alternative to socialism, and it would be useless, as well as hypo-
critical, for any one to object to the collectivism of the New Deal
and yet to cry out that an unmistakable economic monopoly should
be tolerated by the law.'"
g8. See the discussions of Hamilton, Fetter, Bums, Berle, and Laidler, contained
in HANDLER, THE FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAws, A SYMPosIum (1932), for an excellent
presentation of the ideas of the diverse schools of thought upon this question.
99. Jackson, Enforcement of Anti-Trust Laws (1937) 3 FED. B. A. J. 71, 73; same
sub nom. Should the Anti-Trust Laws be Revised? (937) 71 U. S. L. REv. 575, 577.
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What, then, is this fearsome bogey, which has supplanted the Standard
Oil Company and the Steel Trust as the target that is to test the effec-
tiveness of antitrust weapons?
The rise of the Aluminum Company of America is an amazing
story. It begins in the year 1886, when Charles Hall, then a young
man of twenty-two and just graduated from Oberlin College, solved
the problem of commercial production of aluminum. 100 Aluminum,
an element nearly twice as abundant as iron, and exceeded in amount
only by the elements silicon and oxygen, had defied all but the most
complicated and expensive methods of reduction, so great is its affinity
to oxygen. Hall, by use of electrochemical methods and the employ-
ment of cryolite, 101 succeeded in producing aluminum at a cost of
about $2 a pound. 102  In 1888, Hall succeeded in interesting Captain
Alfred E. Hunt, a metallurgist in iron and steel, in his process, and
together they organized the Pittsburgh Reduction Company with an
original capital of $20,000. In 189o, the Pittsburgh Reduction Com-
pany was recapitalized at $I,000,000.103 The Pittsburgh Reduction
Company began as a producer of raw aluminum, but the difficulties it
faced in attempting to market it forced the company to expand into
the business of fabricating aluminum products. 04 Once engaged in
the fabricating business, it found it so profitable that by 1933 ingot
production accounted for but 14 per cent. of the various kinds of
aluminum sold, the rest being sheet, castings, wire, and fabricated
products.
In 1907, the Pittsburgh Reduction Company, no longer a small
reducing plant, but now engaged in mining bauxite, the ore from which
aluminum comes, in extracting alumina, the compound of aluminum
oxide from which aluminum is produced, in reducing the aluminum
oxide to aluminum by electrolysis, and in manufacturing and selling
finished aluminum products on a nation wide scale, fittingly enough
changed its corporate title to the Aluminum Company of America. By
various purchases and leases the company had obtained control over
a wide extent of bauxite deposits and the water-power facilities so
essential to the large scale production of aluminum. It had erected
numerous reduction plants, rolling mills and foundries. This expan-
OO. In the same year Paul L. T. H6rault, a Frenchman, independently arrived at
essentially the same process, giving rise to an independent European Aluminum in-
dustry. H~rault's process was never patented in the United States.
ioi. Hall patent (No. 400,766) issued on April 2, I889.
io2. Previously aluminum had sold for twelve dollars a pound.
1O3. The Mellons, A. W., and R. B., became stockholders at this time.
1O4. In this connection see WALLACE, MARKET CONTROL IN THE ALUmINUm INDUs-
TRY (1937) 8-24. For an interesting account of how the Aluminum Company became
engaged in the manufacture of cooking utensils see The Aluminum Company of Alner-
ica (1934) io FoR=U NE No. 3, PP. 46, 5o.
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sion has continued unabated, until at the present time this company,
inaugurated with little fanfare and small capital, has reached the point
where it is a large business with many and extensive holdings 10- and
assets alleged to be of about $25o,oooooo.106 According to the alle-
gations of the government in the present case, the Aluminum Company
controls:
domestically produced virgin aluminum ioo%; alumi-
num wire and cable, extruded and structural shapes, bars, rods,
tubing, virtually iooo; aluminum alloys, more than 95o; alumi-
num sheets, more than 9o; aluminum pistons, approximately
8o%; and aluminum kitchen utensils, approximately 5o7.107
Truly, an economic monopoly!
Prior to June 1928, the Aluminum Company had extensive for-
eign interests, both in bauxite and waterpower facilities. In that month,
however, there was created a legally independent corporation, Alumin-
ium, Limited, a Canadian company, to which the legal title to nearly
all of the Aluminum Company's foreign holdings was transferred.
This was done by distributing pro rata in the ratio of I to 3 the shares
of common (voting) stock in Aluminium, Limited, to the stockhold-
ers of the Aluminum Company. Thus the ownership'108 of the two
companies remained the same. However, there has never been any
interlocking directorate, the two corporations having had neither direc-
tors nor officers in common.
The gaps which have been left unfilled in the foregoing rather
brief story of the development of the Aluminum Company will be filled
in, to a large extent, by a consideration of the litigation in which the
Company has been entangled, for the history of the Aluminum Com-
pany may be traced through the courts in the suits to which it has
been a party. Generally speaking this litigation may be conveniently
separated into three headings: A. patent litigation; B. private suits
under the antitrust laws; and C. governmental proceedings under the
antitrust laws. It is proposed to treat these suits in that order.
lo5. Among these are domestic bauxite deposits at Bauxite, Arkansas, Hermitage,
Georgia, and Eufaula, Alabama, and one foreign source in Dutch Guinea. The bauxite
is reduced to alumina at East St. Louis, Illinois, and the company is constructing an-
other alumina plant at Mobile, Alabama. There are four aluminum producing plants,
at Niagara Falls, at Badin, North Carolina, at Alcoa, Tennessee, and at Massena, New
York. In addition the Aluminum Company or its wholly or partly owned subsidiaries
have numerous fabricating plants engaged in the manufacture of everything aluminum.
io6. According to BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY (1932) 21, the gross assets of the Aluminum Company as of January I, 193o,
amounted to $3o0,o0o,0o0.
Io7. Brief for the United States on the meaning of the Sherman Act, p. 7, United
States v. Aluminum Company of America, Equity No. 85-73 (S. D. N. Y.).
io8. The stock in both corporations is closely held, the majority being owned by




For the first fifteen years of its existence, the Pittsburgh Reduc-
tion Company was engaged in continuous litigation with the Cowles
Electric Smelting and Aluminum Corporation over the exclusive right
to produce aluminum by the electrolytic process. Charles Hall, as we
have seen, had been granted a patent for his process. Before associat-
ing with Captain Alfred E. Hunt, Hall had endeavored to interest the
Cowles people in his process. An optional agreement was even entered
into but the Cowles Company allowed the option to lapse. When the
Pittsburgh Reduction Company commenced operations, external heat-
ing applied to the crucible (which was the method followed by Hall
originally, in order to keep the solvent melted) was abandoned in favor
of internal heating by means of an electric current. Charles S. Bradley
had received a patent 109 for a reduction process using electric current
for internal heating. The Cowles Company began producing virgin
aluminum shortly after the Pittsburgh Reduction Company, although
the existence of the Bradley process was unknown to them until 1892
and they did not obtain title to it until 1897 after considerable litiga-
tion. With the entry of the Cowles company into the manufacture
of virgin aluminum a brief price war ensued lowering the price of
aluminum $0.50 a pound. A bill was brought by the Aluminum Com-
pany against the Cowles company for patent infringement and a per-
petual injunction issued in 1893.110 The Cowles company was forced
to shut down. In 1903 permission for a rehearing was finally ob-
tained."11 However, before a rehearing could take place, the Hall
process as now operated was held to be an infringement of the Brad-
ley patent,112 which the Cowles company had recently acquired after
considerable litigation. 13  Damages to the extent of about $3,000,00o
were assessed against the Pittsburgh Reduction Company. However,
damages of $292,ooo which had been assessed in the previous infringe-
ment proceeding in which the Pittsburgh Reduction Company had ob-
tained a permanent injunction against the Cowles Company 114 had
never been paid by the latter. By virtue of some substantial money
settlement the Pittsburgh Reduction Company obtained the use of the
io9. Patent No. 468,148.
iio. Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Cowles Electric S. & A. Co., 55 Fed. 3oi (C. C.
N. D. Ohio, 1893), rehearing denied, 64 Fed. 125 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, i894).
ix. Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Cowles Electric S. & A. Co., 121 Fed. 556 (C. C.
N. D. Ohio, I9O3).
112. Cowles Electric S. & A. Co. v. Pittsburgh Reduction Co., 125 Fed. 926 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1903), rev'g, ii Fed. 742 (C. C. W. D. N. Y. igoi).
113. Cowles Electric S. & A. Co. v. Lowrey, 79 Fed. 331 (C. C. A. 6th, 1897), rev'g,
68 Fed. 354 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, i895).
114. Pittsburgh Reduction Co. v. Cowles Electric S. & A. Co., 55 Fed. 3oi (C. C.
N. D. Ohio, 1893), rehearing denied, 64 Fed. 125 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1894).
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Bradley patent until its expiration, working under a license and pay-
ing royalties. In turn, the Cowles company agreed not to manufacture
pure aluminum. Thus the result was that the Pittsburgh Reduction
Company obtained a patent monopoly (no more inexpensive or feasible
process of making aluminum available commercially has been discov-
ered) which was to extend until 19o9,115 two years subsequent to the
expiration of the Hall patent. The exclusive effect of the patent mo-
nopoly resulted from the fact that the processes were complementary
to each other. It is interesting to contemplate what might have been
the effect if a cross-licensing agreement had been entered into rather
than the type of settlement which was in fact made. The prospect of
two competitors, at a time when the industry was in its infancy, is an
intriguing one.
B. Private Suits
The most persistent competitor of the Aluminum Company of
America in the manufacture of duralumin, a light and strong alloy
of aluminum, and of other aluminum products has been the Baush
Machine Tool Company, which together with its president, Mr. Haskell,
has waged a lengthy warfare in the courts 116 against the Aluminum
Company, claiming damages under the Sherman Act. Duralumin, the
important aluminum alloy, was invented by one Welm, a German,
and patented in the United States. During the World War, this pat-
ent was confiscated by the Government as the property of a German
national and later turned over to the Chemical Foundation. Both the
Aluminum Company of America and the Baush Machine Tool Com-
pany obtained licenses under the patent. Since the Aluminum Com-
pany was the sole American producer of virgin aluminum, which the
Baush company needed for its business, the latter had to purchase its
raw metal supply from them or else from foreign producers at substan-
tially the same prices. Moreover, it was in competition with the Alumi-
num Company as a producer of the alloy and other products. In
1919, the Baush Company brought suit against the Aluminum Com-
pany in the District Court for the District of Massachusetts which
remained pending, though never tried,l1v until another and similar
suit was instituted in the District Court in Connecticut in 1931. The
115. Professor Wallace, op. cit. supra note 1O4, at IoI, speaks of the tremendous
advantage the enjoyment of this patent monopoly for such length of time gave the
Aluminum Company over potential competitors.
116. It is worthy of note that in these suits the Baush Co. and Mr. Haskell were
represented by the firm of Cummings & Lockwood, of Stamford, Conn., as counsel.
Mr. Homer Stille Cummings was the United States Attorney General under whom
the present suit against the Aluminum Company was instituted.
117. A second suit was instituted in Massachusetts in 1928, but after several post-
ponements was dropped.
ALUMINUM AND MONOPOLY
gist of the complaint as given by Chase J., in the Circuit Court of
Appeals of the Second Circuit during one phase of the litigation was
as follows:
"(i) That the defendant has monopolized interstate trade
in virgin aluminum by unlawfully combining and agreeing with
the foreign producers 118 that they will all charge substantially
the same prices for virgin aluminum, in this country; (2) that
it so combined and agreed with Aluminium, Limited, that Alu-
minium, Limited, would not compete with it in the United States
by selling virgin aluminum here; (3) that it did itself, and with
its domestic subsidiaries, monopolize and restrain interstate trade
in virgin aluminum; and (4) that it did, or attempted to, in con-
cert with its domestic subsidiaries, monopolize interstate trade in
substantial part by keeping the price of virgin aluminum high and
the price of products manufactured from it low so that it was
impossible for the defendant (plaintiff?) to compete with it in
the manufacture of aluminum products, in that the cost of de-
fendant's raw material plus the cost of manufacture and sale ex-
ceeded the price at which its product could be sold in competition
with similar products so manufactured and sold by the defend-
ant." 119
These are substantially the same charges as are made by the Govern-
ment in the suit now in progress.
After a trial in which a jury found for the Aluminum Company,
an appeal was taken and the judgment entered was reversed and a new
trial ordered because of error in the exclusion of evidence.120  On
retrial, the Baush Company prevailed, the damages of $956,30o as-
sessed by the jury being trebled,121 and attorney's fees awarded in the
sum of $300,000 together with $500 court costs. Upon appeal the
verdict was reversed, chiefly on matters of procedure. 122 There has
been no subsequent litigation, the case having been settled out of court.
Mr. Haskell, president of the Baush company, smarting from a
number of setbacks at the hands of the Aluminum Company in various
dealings with it arising out of his position as a competitor, brought
suit in 1925 against the executors of James B. Duke, the Tobacco King.
Mr. Duke had money to invest and likewise a very valuable source of
waterpower on the Saguenay River in Quebec. He became interested
ii8. These are principally: British Aluminum Company, Limited; L'Aluminium
Francais (French); Aluminium Industrie (Swiss); and Vereinigte Aluminum Werke
Aktiengesellschaft (German).
ii. See Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F. (2d) 217,
219 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
12. Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Company of America, 72 F. (2d) 236
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 589 (1934).
121. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1927).
I22. Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 79 F. (2d) 217 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1935).
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in the aluminum business and had numerous conferences with Mr.
Haskell relating to the establishment of an aluminum manufacturing
business on the Saguenay development. Mr. Haskell, of course, hoped
thus to free himself of dependence on the Aluminum Company for his
supply of virgin aluminum, so necessary to the manufacture of duralu-
min. After a considerable time spent by Mr. Haskell, in investigating
the feasibility of such an enterprise, Mr. Duke sold his power site to
the Aluminum Company.12 3  Mr. Haskell sued the executors of Mr.
Duke, since deceased, for treble damages under the Sherman Act.
The lower court allowed damages to the sum of $8,oooooo but refused
to treble them, holding such damages to be punitive and hence not
surviving the deceased.' 2 4 Both parties appealed and the judgment
was reversed, the circuit court of appeals holding that there was in-
sufficient evidence to sustain the finding of any contract such as that
alleged by Mr. Haskell.-2 5 The net result of all this litigation extending
over a period of sixteen years leaves the Aluminum Company as firmly
intrenched as ever, and although it received a monetary recompense
in the settlement out of court, the Baush company is in no better posi-




In 1911, during another "trust-busting" era, the federal govern-
ment filed a petition against the Aluminum Company for violation of
the Sherman Act. The Aluminum Company or its subsidiaries had
in three contracts with independent concerns, dealing with the pur-
chase or sale of bauxite and alumina, incorporated into the contracts
restrictive agreements which resulted in the Aluminum Company retain-
ing its monopoly over the manufacture of aluminum.12 7  Another re-
123. According to Wallace, op. cit. supra note 3O4, at 336, the Duke interests re-
ceived $i6,oooooo par value of the preferred stocks of the new Aluminum Company of
America, equivalent to one-ninth of the issue, and 15 per cent. of the no-par common.
124. Haskell v. Perkins, 28 F. (2d) 222 (D. N. J. 3928).
125. Perkins v. Haskell, 31 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 3d, 1929), cert. denied, 279 U. S.
872 (1929).
126. Note, The Alhminum Industry: An Anti-Trust Experience (1937) 37 COL.
L. REV. 269, 288, n. 97.
127. These agreements were as follows: In 195o with the General Chemical Com-
pany which covenanted not to convert into aluminum the bauxite sold to it by the Gen-
eral Bauxite Company formerly owned by the General Chemical Company, but which
the Aluminum Company now controlled.
In 19o9, a like agreement with the Norton Company, from whom the Aluminum
Company had purchased another Bauxite company, the Republic Mining and Manufac-
turing Company.
In i9o7, a contract for the purchase of alumina for from five to ten years from the
Pennsylvania Salt Manufacturing Company, the latter covenanting not to manufacture
aluminum nor to sell alumina to anyone else for the manufacture of aluminum during
the term of the contract.
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strictive agreement had been entered into in a contract for purchase
by the Aluminum Company of shares of stock in the Aluminum Goods
Manufacturing Company, by which the vendors agreed not to compete
with the Aluminum Company in the territory east of Denver for a
period of twenty years.
The Aluminum Company had also entered into an agreement
through its subsidiary, Northern Aluminum Limited, with a French
aluminum company'128 for a division of markets, reserving rights of
sale in the United States to itself.
Besides these allegedly illegal practices, the Government also
charged that the Aluminum Company restricted and controlled the
price and output of its products and had engaged in various types of
unfair practices in restraint of trade, thus obtaining and securing its
monopolistic position.
By a consent decree 129 issued on June 7, 1912, an end was put
to the case before it was under way. This decree declared null and
void the restrictive provisions in the four contracts just spoken of, with
the General Chemical Company, the Norton Company, the Pennsyl-
vania Salt Manufacturing Company and the Aluminum Goods Man-
ufacturing Company. The agreement with the French concern to
divide markets and to restrict importation was also nullified. The
decree likewise enjoined against a number of unfair practices such as
price control, output control, and abuse of the power of control over
raw materials to the injury of competitors. This consent decree, aside
from enjoining against acts which are quite clearly illegal, was other-
wise ineffective,130 leaving the Aluminum Company not in the least
dislodged from its entrenched position. It provided, in effect, for a
recognition of a monopoly status, controlled, however, to the extent
of the injunctions of the decree.
About eight years after the issuance of the consent decree, Sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act 181 was invoked against the Aluminum Com-
pany by the Federal Trade Commission, and its application upheld by
a decision of the circuit court of appeals 182 requiring the Aluminum
Company of America to divest itself of a two-thirds stock interest
which it had acquired in the Aluminum Rolling Mills, on the ground
that such acquisition of assets in a competing company tends sub-
stantially to lessen competition. The interesting sidelight to this case
128. Socift6 Anonyme pour l'Industrie de l'Aluminum of Neuhausen.
129. DEcREES AND JUDGMENTS IN FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST CASES (G. P. 0. 1918)
341.
I30. The restrictive agreements enjoined against had been terminated prior to issu-
ance of the decree.
131. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), IS U. S. C. A. § 18 (1934).
132. Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade Comm., 284 Fed. 4o (C. C. A.
3d, X922), cert denied, 261 U. S. 616 (1923).
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is the subsequent acquisition by the Aluminum' Company, not of 66 2/3
per cent. of the stock interest in the Aluminum Rolling Mills, but of
IOO per cent. by legitimate means. The Aluminum Rolling Mills was
indebted to the Aluminum Company to the extent of $6oo,ooo for
purchases of aluminum ingot. After a compliance with the court order
by selling its two-thirds stock interest in the Aluminum Rolling Mills
to the holder of the one-third interest, the Cleveland Metal Products
Company, for a nominal sum, the Aluminum Company brought suit
on the notes evidencing the indebtedness and bid in the property at an
execution sale. This second case brought the Government a nominal
victory under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, but in the end the Alumi-
num Company got what it wanted.
In 1925, the Federal Trade Commission again opened fire on the
Aluminum Company invoking Section 2 of the Clayton Act 133 and
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.134 The complaint -13
alleged discrimination between purchasers in the matter of prices
charged, a violation of Section 2 of the Clayton Act, and in addition,
such unfair methods of competition as arbitrarily fixing a price differ-
ential between virgin and scrap aluminum, requiring by the terms of
its contracts that purchasers of virgin aluminum sell back their scrap
at fixed prices, charging its agents and subsidiaries less than it charged
its competitors, refusing arbitrarily to sell sheet or ingot aluminum
to its competitors, making incomplete deliveries to its competitors and
delivering to its competitors sheet or ingot aluminum of a quality
inferior to that required-all violations of Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act. The Aluminum Company filed its answer
and after proceedings which stretched out over a period of five years,
the Commission in 193o dismissed the complaint "for the reason that
the charges of the complaint are not sustained by the testimony and
evidence".'"
It is to be noted, therefore, that against the Aluminum Company
of America, the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Federal Trade
Commission Act have proven singularly unavailing. The 1912 con-
sent decree to all intents and purposes aimed at mere regulation and
accomplished nothing toward elimination of the monopolistic condi-
tions in the American aluminum industry. It was a barren victory for
the Government. The Federal Trade Commission has said of this
consent decree that it is "obviously insufficient to restore competitive
133. 38 STAT. 730 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1934).
134. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. §45 (934).
135. In the Matter of Aluminum Company, Docket No. 1335 (Fed. Trade Comm.
1925).
136. In the Matter of Aluminum Co. of America, Docket No. 1335 (Fed. Trade
Comm. 1930).
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conditions in harmony with the antitrust laws".' 31 The Rolling Mills
case,13 the only other suit in which the Government prevailed, was a
hollow victory. As has been described, the decision was circumvented
with comparative ease, and the Aluminum Company finally obtained
even more than it had attempted at first. It now remains to be seen
whether the present prosecution under the Sherman Act will be as
unproductive (from the standpoint of the Government, of course) as
similar proceedings have been in the past.
IV
ALUMINUM HAILED INTO COURT AGAIN
Two years will soon have passed since the filing of the present
suit by the Government against the Aluminum Company of America.
To date, there have been three decisions in the federal courts, from
the district court to the Supreme Court, on a question of venue which
was raised at the outset. The petition was filed on the equity side in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, on April
23, 1937, alleging that the Aluminum Company, together with sixty-
two additional defendants, subsidiaries, officers and directors of said
company were guilty of monopolizing and conspiring to restrain and
monopolize trade and commerce in aluminum and related commodi-
ties. The petition, moreover, set forth devices designed and used to
curtail not only imports of aluminum and aluminum products by Amer-
ican firms, but also exports to the United States by foreign firms. It is
also alleged that the Aluminum Company has a 90 to IOO per cent.
monopoly of aluminum and aluminum products, as a result of which it
has the power to fix arbitrary and unreasonable rates. The petition
prays, to quote the summary of the prayer for relief in the words of
Thompson, C. J.:
c. . that the Aluminum Company of America be dis-
solved; that its properties be rearranged under several separate
and independent corporations; that receivers be appointed; and
that the stockholders of Aluminum Company of America and of
Aluminium Limited divest themselves of their stock in one or the
other of these corporations".
39
Six days after the filing of the petition, the Aluminum Company
filed a petition in the District Court for the Western District of Penn-
137. 3 Rep. Fed. Trade Comm. on the House Furnishings Industry (1924) xxi.
i38. Aluminum Co. of America v. Federal Trade Comm., 284 Fed. 401 (C. C. A.
3d, 1922), cert. denied, 261 U. S. 616 (1923).
139. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2o F. Supp. 6o8, 6IX (W. D. Pa.
1937). A discussion of the issues presented by this petition may be found in Note,
Problems of Anti-Trust Prosecution.: The Alcoa Suit (1939) 48 YALE L. J. 677.
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sylvania in the old case which had been settled by the consent decree
of 1912, seeking an injunction against the Attorney General and his
assistants, restraining them from prosecuting the suit filed in New
York on the ground that the parties, issues, subject matter and the relief
sought were substantially the same as in the 1912 suit in Pennsylvania,
and that consequently the District Court sitting in Pennsylvania had
jurisdiction over the case. A temporary restraining order issued, a
date was set for hearing, and on the return day an Assistant Attorney
General and a Special Assistant Attorney to the Attorney General
appeared specially, moved to quash service of the subpoenas, set aside
the return thereon, dismiss the defendants' petition and vacate the
restraining order. The motion was denied, and after hearing a pre-
liminary injunction issued.
140
Then the Attorney General filed an expediting certificate in the
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania and a special
three judge Expedition Court was formed in accordance with the
statute.14' This court reversed the holding of the district court, dis-
missed the Aluminum Company's petition, quashed service of process
upon government counsel, vacated the preliminary injunction, and de-
nied injunctive relief to the Aluminum Company.142 This was decided
in September, and in December, an appeal having been taken to the
United States Supreme Court, that Court affirmed the decree of the
Expediting Court.
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This question settled and answers filed, hearings were commenced
in the District Court for the Southern District of New York before the
Honorable Francis G. Caffey, D. J., early in 1938 and are still in
progress. The case is of great importance not only because of the
previous history of the Aluminum Company of America and its unique
character, but also, and particularly so, because of the contemporary
antitrust agitation and modern political and economic speculation.
The first and principal allegations and those upon which presum-
ably the government depends for the granting of its prayer for dis-
solution are listed under Heading I, which is summarized by counsel
for the United States, as follows:
"Heading I deals with the Aluminum Company's monop-
olistic position in the trade and industry. The various percent-
ages of the interstate trade in aluminum and aluminum products
which the company controls are set forth, namely: domestically
140. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, ig F. Supp. 374 (W. D. Pa.
1937).
141. 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 15 U. S. C. A. § 28 (1934).
142. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 20 F. Supp. 6o8 (W. D. Pa.
1937).
143. Aluminum Co. of America v. United States, 302 U. S. 230 (1937).
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produced virgin aluminum, ioo%; aluminum wire and cable, ex-
truded and structural shapes, bars, rods, tubing, virtually IOO%;
aluminum alloys, more than 95%; aluminum sheets, more than
90%; aluminum pistons, approximately 8o%; and aluminum kit-
chen utensils, approximately 50%. Its holdings of bauxite de-
posits are alleged to constitute more than 90% of those in the
United States suitable for the commercial production of alumi-
num. The concluding allegations are that this monopolistic con-
trol gives the company the power to fix arbitrary discriminatory
and unreasonable prices and to exclude competitors; that such
control has the direct and immediate effect of suppressing and
preventing substantial competition which would otherwise arise;
and that these acts and circumstances constitute a violation of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act.
"These allegations raise the legal question whether a company
which possesses and exercises this degree of control over inter-
state commerce in certain commodities is monopolizing a part of
interstate commerce in violation of Section 2 irrespective of any
showing as to its purpose to monopolize (except in so far as this
purpose is to be implied under the doctrine that a person is pre-
sumed to intend the necessary consequences of his acts), and irre-
spective of any showing as to predatory practices or as to the
exaction of unreasonable prices." 144 (Italics supplied.)
The other allegations are of various contracts in restraint of trade,
stock and property acquisitions, and coercive tactics in restraint of
trade. Substantiation of these allegations depend in large measure
upon sufficiency of proof and matters of evidence, and as may be
observed from reading the opening statements for the Government, in-
volve many matters which have formed the basis for previous anti-
trust proceedings against the Aluminum Company. Inasmuch, there-
fore, as they involve matters of fact, it would be useless to speculate
at this time upon whether or not any or all of them may be substan-
tiated. Instead it would be wiser to consider the provocative question
raised by the Government in Heading I mentioned above, the legal
question as to whether or not a company occupying such a preponder-
ant position in a particular industry as to give it the power to control
prices is illegal and a monopoly per se, regardless of purpose, preda-
tory practices or reasonableness of prices.1 45
144. Brief for United States on meaning of Sherman Act (filed Sept. 21, 1938)
pp. 7-8, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, Equity No. 85-73 (S. D. N. Y.
1937).
145. That this is the important legal question raised by the Government in this
case may be further shown by the statement of Mr. Walter Rice, of counsel for the
Government, in his opening statement where he says: "There may be a bare question
of law presented in this case as to whether or not the one hundred per cent. monopoly
enjoyed by the Aluminum Company of America is illegal per se, in and of itself, irre-
spective of the manner in which the monopoly was attained." United States v. Alumi-
num Co. of America, Equity No. 85-73 (S. D. N. Y. 1937), Opening Statement for the
Government, June 1, 1938, p. 3.
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In view of the previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which have been discussed, it would appear that from a legal
standpoint this proposition would be extremely difficult to maintain,
regardless of how true the statement may be from an economic stand-
point. The Aluminum Company is of course unique. It was pro-
tected by a patent monopoly for nineteen years. It expanded consid-
erably during those nineteen years both vertically and horizontally, so
much so that at the time its patents expired it was so firmly entrenched,
held such extensive sources of raw materials, such important water-
power facilities and manufacturing plants as to make it extremely un-
wise for any one without a bottomless pocketbook to enter into com-
petition with it, particularly in the production of virgin aluminum. 146
It was forced by necessity during its early years of struggle to enter
the fabricating business. All of these considerations but serve to illus-
trate the difficulties facing the Government. The consent decree of
1912 may well serve to be a stumbling block, since in that suit the
Government conceded that the existence of the aluminum monopoly
was lawful. 1. 4  The Standard Oil case and its "rule of reason", the
United States Steel case, holding that intent to monopolize and preda-
tory practices discontinued and abandoned cannot, because they need
not, be enjoined, and other federal cases may well serve to overthrow
the novel proposition advanced by the Government. The various points
raised in the discussion at the end of Part II of this article would
seem to indicate that at least under the Sherman Act and the inter-
pretation so far given to it, the courts would be extremely loath to
accede to a doctrine of monopoly per se. It has been accorded recog-
nition, it is true in the railroad cases. It has been explained that this
is due to the fact that railroads are in a special class of industry, oper-
ating under a franchise from the state. Where "loose" combinations
are involved and there is a price-fixing agreement, the doctrine of
monopoly per se is applicable as in the Trenton Potteries case. This
case, however, seems distinguishable from the instant case on so many
grounds that an extension of the doctrines there enunciated to apply
to this case seems scarcely probable. The question as to whether or
not such a doctrine as that of monopoly per se., i. e. based on mere
power to control the market, is economically more sound is another
question. If so, then perhaps the difficulty lies with the present laws
or the interpretation of them!
146. One company made an abortive attempt. The Southern Aluminium Company,
a French concern, started to build a plant for the production of virgin aluminum at
Badin, North Carolina. Unfortunately the combination of the World War and heavy
expense caused it to sell out the uncompleted plant to the Aluminum Company of
America which finished it and now operates it.
147. Thompson, J., in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 2o F. Supp.
6o8, 6ii (W. D. Pa. 1937).
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As to the relief prayed for by the petition, dissolution seems quite
unlikely to be achieved unless, of course, the Government can estab-
lish its contention that the Aluminum Company is a monopoly per se,
since, it would appear, that this is not a combination of competing units.
Any wrongful acquisitions by the company may, however, be dis-
joined. The question of public policy is an important consideration
in dissolution proceedings. However, since the problem of dissolution
is probably dependent upon the showing of facts in the case at bar,
it would seem rather futile to speculate upon it here.
The prayer of the Government that the stockholders of the Alumi-
num Company of America and of Aluminium, Limited, divest them-
selves of their stock in one or the other of these corporations, presents
some difficulties. Because on the surface, at least, they are separate
corporations, without any officers or directors in common, it is quite
improbable that the two corporations would be held to be a combina-
tion with unified control without a great deal of evidence being adduced
to prove a common control. It is not illegal for separate corporate
entities to have the same stockholders. The decree of dissolution in
the Northern Securities case had the effect of leaving two competing
corporations with the ownership of stock in the two in the same hands.
Such was also the effect of the dissolution of the Standard Oil Com-
pany. In considering the dissolution decree proposed in the American
Tobacco Company case, the Court adverted to the decrees issued in the
Northern Securities and Standard Oil cases, drawing as a conclusion
from them the fact that "common ownership" was not forbidden,
that the Court would not have approved of the arrangements made
in those cases unless it was satisfied that "common ownership" was not
illegal..
48
However, a careful student in answering the question, "what is
a public utility?", once wrote "as to what the Supreme Court has passed
on I can look it up: as to what it may be newly asked to pass on I shall
wait and see". 149 It would seem, therefore, that before answering the
novel questions raised in the case against the Aluminum Company, one
way or the other, it would be well to await the pronouncement of the
Court. A great deal depends upon the resolution of the various prob-
lems afforded by the case. The status of our present antitrust weapons
will be more sharply defined by a decision of the questions now raised.
To boldy prognosticate would be folly. But if the Court should accede
to the novel propositions set forth by the Government, it will be inter-
esting to see how previous decisions are reconciled-if they are or
can be.
148. United States v. American Tobacco Co., 191 Fed. 371, 388 (911).
149. Robinson, The Public Utility: A Problem in Social Engineering (1928) 14
CORN. L. Q. 1, 9.
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POSTSCRIPT
The problem confronting our Government today is the achieve-
ment of a workable control over monopoly. To state the problem more
narrowly, to particularize, detail or qualify is to belie the verity of
its magnitude and generality.
If the Government wins its case against the Aluminum Company
in the traditional manner that antitrust cases have been won before-
i. e. by a showing of fairly well defined predatory practices-one may
well ask what has been accomplished. If we have our eye on the larger
problem, which is really what matters, we may be forced to conclude
that there has been much ado about nothing. A few business men may
be frightened and the Supreme Court may be acclaimed for taking a
somewhat more realistic view of what are to be regarded as predatory
practices, but such gain will lose its utility almost as readily as the
newspaper which chronicles the decision.
If the Government should prevail on its contention that a hun-
dred per cent. monopoly is illegal per se-and that must at least be
counted a possibility, though only a possibility-a new day will have
dawned, and there will be rejoicing in the breast of one but lately mem-
ber of the Supreme Court.150 Then lawyers and economists will have
begun to talk the same language. The Court will have come to restate
the meaning of monopoly in terms of market economics, and we may
start afresh from a new definition. If this happens, the Sherman Act
will be an effective instrument for the first time in the nearly half
century of its unhappy life. If this happens, none is likely to say
again that the Sherman Act was never "intended to mean anything
save a big noise to gull the gullible". 151
But whether this case is won or lost, legislation is in the offing.
What will be its nature? Will it be a mere tinkering with the anti-
trust laws ? 152 Not unless Congress fumbles. One thing is sure-
monopoly and monopolistic practices will be more clearly defined. The
Administration has apparently learned valuable lessons from previous
attempts at regulating business. It is seeking at least to avoid the
accusation of approaching the problem in slap-dash fashion. It is too
I5O. It was Mr. Justice Brandeis who said that "the essence of restraint is power"
and that "power may arise merely out of position". Dissent in American Column and
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 414 (1921).
151. Beard, The Trust Problem (1938) 96 NEw REPUBLIC 182.
152. The Attorney General has suggested that far more is needed: "In short, the
anti-trust laws need clarification and restatement. They need to be adapted to our
modern problems more realistically and intelligently, and they need behind them the
drive of adequately financed enforcement machinery." Cummings, The Unsolved Prob-
lem of Monopoly (1938) 72 U. S. L. REv. 23, 27.
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early to evaluate the work of the Temporary National Economic Com-
mittee. Upon what it finds, upon what it recommends and upon what
the Congress can make out of it all in the way of legislation will depend
the shape of things to come. Doubtless, either the existing antitrust
laws will be clarified as carefully as legislative science can do it or the
Sherman Law will be repealed and we shall probably see a new anti-
trust law in the drafting of which both lawyers and economists will
do their level best to see that their two disciplines are brought some-
where near each other.
But it is more than doubtful whether new and better antitrust leg-
islation will serve the public to much greater advantage than does our
present law. The gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion
seems almost inescapable-even though we recognize "bigness" as an
evil in itself. How big is big? What percentage of control of a given
industry is bad? We shall still have to deal with each particular indus-
try, and each is different from the other. Some mighty troublesome
line drawing will have to be done.
There are those in high places who have suggested that the public
utility concept must be expanded. 153 Perhaps that can be done. But,
so far as the Federal Government may regulate, it is of course limited
to industries engaged in interstate commerce.15 4 That puts much of it
up to the states and there seem to be almost insurmountable difficul-
ties in the way of satisfactory federal-state co6peration. 155 So it ap-
pears that really effective regulation must wait upon a Constitutional
Amendment.
153. The Attorney General: "Indeed, there are those who are persuaded that eco-
nomic groups that in one wvay or another have arrived at a position of dominance in
any essential line of activity are likely candidates for regulatory treatment-and that
this is especially true with reference to so-called natural monopolies or lines of business
dealing with national resources." Ibid.
S. E. C. Commissioner Jerome Frank: "The category, public utility, is not a closed
one. It has grown ever larger in the course of our history. Any time that the com-
petitive element in an industry is found to be socially disvaluable and is wiped out, then
that industry becomes a public utility. The Supreme Court, over a long period, gave
decisions to the effect that, constitutionally, our legislative bodies could so deal with
but a few selected industries. But in the Nebbia case, decided in 1933, it reversed that
attitude, and there now seems to be no constitutional obstacle to prevent the legislatures
of the several states from enacting laws making any industry a public utility." FRANK,
SAvE AmERCA FIRsT (1938) 312.
154. See RIBBLE, STATE AND NATIONAL PowER ovER COMMERCE (1937) 147 et seq.
155. See CLARK, THE RIsE OF A NEw FEmERALIsm (1938) cc. i and 2.
